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It is becoming increasingly mainstream to claim that conscious will is an illusion. This
assertion is based on a host of findings that indicate conscious will does not share an
efficient-cause relationship with actions. As an alternative, the present paper will propose
that conscious will is not about causing actions, but rather, about constraining action
systems toward producing outcomes. In addition, it will be proposed that we generate
and sustain multiple outcomes simultaneously because the multi-scale dynamics by which
we do so are, themselves, self-sustaining. Finally, it will be proposed that self-sustaining
dynamics entail meaning (i.e., conscious content) because they naturally and necessarily
constitute embodiments of context.
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While the present paper addresses the relationship between con-
sciousness and action control, its ultimate goal is to propose
that terms such as “action” and “consciousness” are scientifi-
cally inadequate and, in the end, may have to be replaced in
a scientific account of what we do, how we do it, and why it
has meaning. This is because, as I will argue, the current con-
ceptual framework used in cognitive science (e.g., perception,
cognition, action, attention, intention, and consciousness) is not
capable of addressing the complex array of causal regularities
that have been discovered in cognitive science over the past
30 years.
In addition, the current conceptual framework has yet to give
rise to a scientific conception of how we do what we do that ren-
ders the phenomenon of “consciousness” a necessary aspect of the
causal story. That is, consciousness is described as either identical
with the physical (i.e., identity theory), emergent from the phys-
ical (i.e., emergentism), as an informational property of causal
relations (i.e., functionalism), or as an aspect of reality other than
the physical (i.e., double-aspect theory and property dualism). In
all of these positions, consciousness is not a logically necessary
aspect of the causal story. That is, the scientific, causal description
of how we do what we do is able to disregard consciousness as a
causal factor.
While the notion that consciousness might not be logically
necessary is certainly popular, one might also take it to indicate
the need for an approach to “how we do what we do” that ren-
ders consciousness causal (i.e., non-ephiphenomenal). In what
follows, I present Wild Systems Theory as an approach to causal-
ity and consciousness that renders the latter logically necessary.
To be sure, by the time this has been explicated, the term “con-
sciousness” will mean something different that what is referred
to via constructs such as Access Consciousness, Metacognition,
and Phenomenal Consciousness (Block, 1995, 2001; Cleeremans,
2005).
WHATWE DO
One of the reasons consciousness is not seen as logically neces-
sary in scientific accounts of “what we do” is because we do not
conceptualize it as an activity. In contemporary cognitive science,
“what we do,” is conceptualized via terms such as perceive, act,
think, attend, intend, infer, cognize, represent, remember, simu-
late, and behave. Notice that all of these terms are verbs. When
the concept “consciousness” is thrown into the mix, it enters as a
noun. In short, consciousness is not conceptualized as something
we do.
In the early days of experimental psychology, this was not
the case. In fact, consciousness was seen as an act of intending,
“. . . all experience involves directedness toward an object. . . Every
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself”
(Ash, 1995, p. 28), and there was much theory regarding “con-
scious acts,” not in the sense that consciousness caused certain
actions, but rather, in the sense that certain conscious states were,
themselves, actions (i.e., mental acts).
CONSCIOUS THOUGHT AS AN EFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION
As experimental psychology moved away from consciousness
and turned toward behavior in the early 1900s, explanations of
“what we do” came to be couched in terms of efficient cause
relationships between “stimuli” and “behavior.” And as cogni-
tive psychology later challenged behaviorism’s unwillingness to
appeal to internal process (Tolman, 1951; Chomsky, 1959) it
nonetheless adopted behaviorism’s commitment to discovering
efficient cause relationships. And now, instead of efficient cause
residing between stimuli and responses, or vice versa, it has
www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 574 | 1
Jordan Wild Ways of Conscious Will
come to permeate the entire servo-mechanistic architecture that
ultimately connects perceptual inputs to internal representations
(i.e., cognitive structures) to behavioral outputs1.
Within such a servo-mechanistic framework, the relationship
between consciousness and action control tends to be described
such that conscious thoughts are modeled as causing actions.
Another way to say this is that thoughts share an efficient cause
relationship with actions. Despite the apparent obviousness of
this claim, findings have come to the fore over the past few
decades that severely challenge this idea. Wegner (2002) organizes
these finding around Michotte’s (1963) work on the percep-
tion of causality. Specifically, inspired by Hume (1739/1888) and
his assertion that our sense of conscious agency constitutes yet
another example of “perceived” causality based on contingent
correlation (vs. metaphysical causality), Michotte discovered that
our sense of causality was dependent upon the principles of pri-
ority (i.e., event A must precede event B for A to be experienced
as the cause of B), consistency (i.e., the more event A is consistent
with event B, the more event A is experienced as being the cause
of event B), and exclusivity (i.e., the fewer event As there are, the
more an event A is experienced as the cause of event B).
In Wegner’s (2002) work, these principles translate into the
idea that we perceive ourselves (i.e., our thoughts) to be the
cause of our own actions to the extent our thoughts precede
our actions (i.e., priority), our actions are consistent with our
preceding thoughts (i.e., consistency), and our thoughts are the
only available cause of our actions (i.e., exclusivity). Wegner then
reports multiple examples of how violations of these principles
lead to illusions of conscious will (i.e., feeling as though we caused
actions we did not cause, or feeling as though we did not cause
actions that we, in fact, did).
As regards priority, Wegner points to Kornhuber and Deecke’s
(1965) classic work on the Bereitschaftspotential (readiness
potential), a negativity in the supplementary motor cortex that
begins roughly 1 s prior to the initiation of a voluntary fin-
ger flexion. In Libet’s (1985) classic work, he found that while
the Bereitschaftspotential begins roughly 1 s before a movement,
one becomes consciously aware of having planned a movement
roughly 200ms before the movement. This discrepancy is often
interpreted as implying that the brain knows what one is planning
to do before one is even aware of it. Wegner argues this con-
stitutes a violation of the priority principle. That is, if thoughts
cause actions, the “thought” of planning the tap should precede
the onset of preparatory brain dynamics.
As regards consistency, Wegner (2002) cites Langer and Roth’s
(1975) finding that people are more likely to feel as though they
controlled a chance event (e.g., they willed a particular number to
result from the roll of a die) if they have previous experience suc-
cessfully predicting such events. Wegner claims this to be evidence
1To be sure, there have been those who have critiqued experimental psychol-
ogy’s reliance on efficient cause explanations all throughout its history. These
critiques have come primarily from researchers espousing a more dynamic
approach to psychological functionality including the Gestalt psychologists
(Ash, 1995), the New Realists such as Holt and Gibson (Charles, 2011), and
a host of contemporary researchers making use of dynamical systems theory
such as van Gelder (1998); Van Orden and Holden (2002), and Coey et al.
(2012). These will be discussed in the section below entitled, “How we do it.”
for the illusory nature of conscious will because people felt them-
selves to be in control of an event they were not in control of,
simply because the final event was consistent with their preceding
thoughts.
Finally, as regards exclusivity, Wegner reports research of his
own (Wegner et al., 2003) in which participants completed a
simple yes/no reaction time task while a confederate sat behind
them. The confederate reached around the participant’s torso and
held her index fingers just above the fingers the participant was
using to indicate yes/no responses. The confederates never made
contact with the participant’s fingers. And although the partic-
ipants were accurate on 87% of the trials, they attributed 37%
of the influence for the answers to the confederate. In short, the
simple availability of the confederate as a potential cause of the
response led the participants to experience a reduction in their
own efficacy.
Wegner (2002) uses the above-mentioned experiments, as well
as many, many others, to support the claim that conscious will
is an illusion. That is, since these data so clearly reveal that our
sense of agency (i.e., the feeling that our thoughts are the cause
of our actions) is vulnerable to Michotte’s (1963) principles of
perceived causality, it must be the case that we are incorrect, and
our sense of agency is actually an illusion. The true causes of our
actions are unconscious, automatic associations between percep-
tion and action, what Bargh and Chartrand (1999) refer to as the
“perception-action” link.
To be sure, there are contemporary cognitive scientists who
disagree with the idea that conscious will is an illusion (see
Baumeister et al., 2010). The point of addressing this issue so
thoroughly at present is to propose that perhaps the reason con-
scious will is seen as being illusory is because certain researchers
have committed themselves to an efficient cause approach to psy-
chological functionality (i.e., how do we do what we do) that has
historically led to the implicit assumption that thoughts cause
actions. That is, it may be the case that thoughts did not evolve
to cause actions, and the notion that conscious will is an illusion
is a misconception one derives from a commitment to an illusory,
efficient-cause architecture regarding the relationship between
consciousness and action.
THOUGHT, ACTION, AND EVENT CONTROL
Every year, millions of people all over the world watch pro-
fessional soccer matches. During such matches, referees make
judgments about the intentional states of players whenever the
ball makes contact with a player’s hand. The judgment has to do
with whether or not the player intended (i.e., pre-specified) that
the hand should hit the ball. While the anecdote might seem out
of place, it nicely illustrates what is at stake in the conversation
regarding the nature of conscious will. For if the referee decides
the player acted intentionally, what is it that the player intended?
Did the player pre-specify a particular movement of the hand or
a particular outcome (i.e., hit the ball)?
William James (1890) believed that voluntary action had more
to do with outcomes than limb movements:
I trust that I have now made clear what that ‘idea of a movement’
is which must precede it in order that it be voluntary. It is not the
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thought of the innervation which the movement requires. It is the
anticipation of the movement’s sensible effects, resident, or remote,
and sometimes very remote indeed. (Volume 2, p. 521)
James’ assertion that voluntary action involves the pre-
specification (i.e., anticipation) of a movement’s “sensible effects”
is consistent with the notion that what is pre-specified during
intentional action is the outcome, not limb movement. James
then describes different levels of sensible effects: resident, remote,
and very remote. “Resident” refers to the proximal, somatosen-
sory, kinesthetic effects of movement. “Remote” refers to the
distal effects of movement (e.g., seeing and feeling oneself make
contact with a soccer ball). “Very remote indeed,” refers to effects
beyond ones current context that one can pre-specify and work
toward (e.g., going to the store to buy a bottle of milk, saving
money to buy a new stereo, or becoming a college graduate).
Common to all three of these levels of sensible effects is the
fact that (1) they can be pre-specified and therefore constitute
intentionality, and (2) the pre-specification is of “effects” that will,
at some point in time (i.e., proximal, distal, and abstract) result
from movement. In short, inspired by James, it is my contention
that “what we do” is best described as the pre specification and
control of effects at multiple times scales, simultaneously; what I
refer to as multi-scale effect control (MSEC). For example, as one
dances a Tango with another, one simultaneously controls limb
movements (i.e., proximal effects), one’s distance from the part-
ner (i.e., distal effects), and the larger-scale pattern of successfully
completing an entire, pre-specified dance (i.e., abstract effects).
All three levels are pre-specified and controlled continuously and
simultaneously.
On the one hand, the notion that we pre-specify and con-
trol effects at multiple time-scales simultaneously seems at odds
with the feeling that conscious will tends to involve one pre-
specification at a time (e.g., pick up the pen, answer the question,
walk to the store). In what follows, I review recent findings that
reveal the brain continuously feeds memories of the past into the
present as anticipation about the future, at multiple time scales
simultaneously. In short, the anticipation of effects, resident,
remote, and very remote indeed, constitutes a design principle of
the brain.
MULTI-SCALE EFFECT CONTROL AND THE BRAIN
Over the past three decades, neuroscientists have discovered
recursive connections between the cortex and the cerebellum
that continuously render cortical activity anticipatory. Neurons in
motor cortex, for example, project to neurons in the spinal cord
as well to neurons in the cerebellum. These same cerebellar neu-
rons receive inputs form the sensory neurons located in the limbs
that are made to move by the associated motor neurons (Kawato
et al., 1987). These cerebellar neurons project back to cortex.
Thus, as one learns a particular limb movement (e.g., an infant
learning to grasp a ball), and successful movements are repeated,
successful command-feedback regularities become stored in these
cortical-cerebellar networks such that when the infant later initi-
ates such a movement, the cerebellar neurons are able to prime
the motor cortical neurons before sensory feedback arrives from
the moving limb. This is because the cortical-cerebellar networks
have a time-cycle of 10–20ms, while actual sensory feedback has a
time-cycle of 120ms. This faster-than-feedback time-cycle allows
us to generate very fast, controlled body movements.
Kawato et al. (1987) refer to this cerebellar priming of cortex as
anticipatory motor error, Clark (2001) and Grush (2004) refer to
it as virtual feedback, and Paulin (1993) refers to it as dynamic
state estimation. Quite often, these cerebro-cerebellar networks
are referred to as forwardmodels (Miall, 2003;Wolpert et al., 2003;
Ito, 2005, 2008; Shadmehr and Krakauer, 2008; Golfinopoulos
et al., 2009; Koziol and Lutz, 2013), and/or cerebellar control
models (Koziol et al., 2011). Common to all these nomenclatures
is the assertion that cerebellar-cortical networks are anticipa-
tory and that the anticipation they entail derives from previous
experience.
In addition to sharing recursive innervation with the motor
cortex, the cerebellum also shares such connectivity with the
reticular, autonomic, and limbic systems, as well as the pre-
frontal cortex, multimodal regions of the posterior parietal lobes,
and the temporal lobes (Schmahmann, 2001). These recursive
cerebro-cerebellar connections entail a two-step feedforward pro-
jection from cortex to the pons to the cerebellum, and a two-
step feedback projection from cerebellum to thalamus to cortex
(Schmahmann, 2001). Koziol et al. (2011) assert that the entire
cortex is innervated by the cerebellum, save for the inferior tem-
poral cortex, while Buckner et al. (2011) hypothesize the entire
cortex is represented in the cerebellum, save very early vision
and audition centers. Regardless of these small differences, it is
clear the vast majority of the cortex shares recursive innervation
with the cerebellum. Given these cortical projections to cerebel-
lum are functionally segregated, it seems the brain entails a host
of cerebellar control models (Koziol et al., 2011).
The discovery of memory-primed, prospective cerebro-
cerebellar networks holds major implications for consciousness
and action-control specifically, and cognitive science more gener-
ally. To begin, the existence of such networks constitutes evidence
for James’ (1890) assertion that what makes an action voluntary
is the pre-specification of its “sensible effects.” While this idea
conjures up images of an individual expending large amounts
of conscious effort to imagine (i.e., pre-specify) what an action’s
sensible effects should be like, the notion of prospective cerebro-
cerebellar networks illustrates how such pre-specifications are
continuously fed to the cortex via its connections with the cerebel-
lum. Activity in the cortex is continuously rendered prospective
(i.e., anticipatory) as past experiences stored in cerebro-cerebellar
networks are fed forward in the present as anticipations about
what should happen next.
The discovery of prospective cerebro-cerebellar networks also
provides support for James’ (1890) assertion that “sensory effects”
can be pre-specified at many different scales: resident (proximal),
remote (distal), and very-remote, indeed (abstract). This implies
that as we think, perceive, and act, cortical areas involved in such
activities are continuously primed by past thoughts, past percep-
tions, and past actions stored in cerebro-cerebellar circuits. In
short, cognition, perception, and action are all prospective, and
what is “pre-specified” in each is the potential, eventual occur-
rence of an effect at an abstract, distal, or proximal time scale.
Ito (1993) recognized this aspect of brain design decades ago
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and used it to argue that the neurodynamics underlying thought
were of the same kind as those underlying movement control.
The notion of a neurodynamic homology underlying thought
and action is shared by many researchers (Schmahmann, 2001;
Koziol et al., 2011; Ito, 2012; Koziol and Lutz, 2013), and it
led Kinsbourne and Jordan (2009) to claim that anticipation
constitutes a design principle of the brain.
Another point to make about such neurodynamic homology
is the fact that all of these different event control systems func-
tion simultaneously. This means that future outcomes are being
specified continuously at the proximal, distal, and abstract scale.
For example, as one walks down a flight of stairs while talking
to a friend and consciously anticipates what the friend will say
next, one is simultaneously unaware of the fact that future out-
comes are being generated for the feet; that is, until one steps
out onto the floor and begins to fall forward because the floor
is not there. During this moment of surprise, one is aware of
the discrepancy between the pressure one was supposed to feel
when the foot landed on the floor, and the unanticipated lack
of pressure experienced because the floor was not there. It is in
this moment of conscious error detection that one realizes she
was unconsciously anticipating a certain amount of pressure on
the bottom of the foot at a particular moment in the foot’s tra-
jectory. This unconsciously anticipated pressure on the foot is a
pre-specified proximal outcome. It was generated as the cerebel-
lum continuously and unconsciously primed the cortex with past
patterns associated with negotiating stairs. In addition, the brain
simultaneously generated conscious predictions about the con-
versation. In short, cerebro-cerebellar loops result in the cortex
being continuously primed for events at multiple time-scales (i.e.,
proximal, distal, and abstract), simultaneously.
PERCEPTION AND ACTION AS MULTI-SCALE EFFECT CONTROL
While on the one hand it seems appropriate to conceptualize
motor control (i.e., proximal effect control) as being mediated via
cerebro-cerebellar control loops, it is more challenging to con-
ceptualize perception as being controlled via such loops. This is
because traditional approaches to how we do what we do implic-
itly, if not explicitly, conceptualize perception as an attention-
attenuated input that, in the end, is used to guide action. In what
follows, I review research in the area of spatial perception in the
hope of demonstrating how one might conceptualize perception
as distal effect control.
Research on spatial perception clearly indicates we perceive the
location of distal stimuli prospectively, in relation to the “sensible
effects” we are pre-specifying for the distal stimulus. For exam-
ple, it has been known for some time that the perceived vanishing
point of a moving stimulus is localized beyond the actual van-
ishing point in the direction of stimulus motion (Hubbard, 1995,
2005). In addition, the magnitude of the spatial displacement (sd)
varies with the laws of physics, in that the faster the stimulus
movements, the larger the SD.
While SD is often accounted for in terms of representational
momentum—the idea that evolution has endowed the brain
with the ability to present dynamic as well as static properties—
Jordan (2009) argues SD has more to do with planning dynamics
than representational dynamics. In Kerzel et al. (2001) SD was
eliminated, and in Jordan et al. (2002), SD actually became nega-
tive (i.e., participants perceived the stimulus to vanish behind its
actual vanishing point) if participants were asked to fixate on a
centrally located fixation cross as the stimulus moved across the
screen, or moved around the fixation cross, respectively. That is,
once participants were not allowed to track the movements of
the stimulus with their eyes, which requires planning, forward SD
vanished.
Further experiments reveal that the “planning” that gives rise
to SD has to do with the movements of the distal stimulus (i.e.,
remote sensory effects according to James, 1890), not the move-
ments of the body (i.e., proximal effects). For example, Jordan
et al. (2002) asked participants to fixate on a centrally located fixa-
tion cross as a stimulus moved on a circular trajectory around the
fixation cross. Half of the participants were asked to press a button
as soon as the stimulus began to move (i.e., the cue condition).
The other half was asked to press the button in order to make
the stimulus vanish (i.e., the intention condition). This manipu-
lation resulted in two groups of participants who were generating
the same proximal effects (i.e., fixate on a fixation cross and press
a button) in order to obtain different distal effects (i.e., respond
to the stimulus’ onset or make it vanish). In the cue condition
the pre-specified distal effect referred to the initial position of
the stimulus, while in the intention condition, it referred to final
position.
When participants pressed the button the stimulus van-
ished. Participants then indicated the perceived vanishing point.
Analyses revealed that those responding to the onset of the stim-
ulus (i.e., the cue condition) saw it vanish behind the actual
vanishing point, in the direction of the initial position, while
those who pressed the button to make the stimulus vanish (i.e.,
the intention condition) saw it vanish precisely where it had van-
ished. This difference in perceived vanishing points is consistent
with the assertion that the influence of planning on spatial per-
ception derives from the distal effect (i.e., stimulus movements)
the participant is planning, not the body movements (i.e., prox-
imal effects) generated in order produce the distal effect. Both
groups were specifying and controlling the same proximal effects
(i.e., hold the eyes in a certain position and move the finger in a
certain way), but they were doing so for different distal reasons.
For those in the cue condition, the specified distal effect (i.e., press
the button as soon as the stimulus appears) referred to the ini-
tial position of the distal stimulus, and the perceived vanishing
points were attracted backward toward this initial position. For
those in the intention condition, the specified distal effect (i.e.,
press the button in order to make the stimulus vanish) referred to
the final position of the distal stimulus, and given the vanishing
point was known by the participants because they pre-specified it
and produced it, there was no SD.
Collectively, the data of Kerzel et al. (2001) and Jordan et al.
(2002) indicate that the an important portion of the SD experi-
enced in studies involving oculomotor tracking (Hubbard, 2005)
derives from the planning required to keep the eyes aligned
with the movements of the stimulus. This is consistent with
James’ (1890) assertion that we are able to pre-specify remote
(i.e., distal) effects. Another important aspect of these distal pre-
specifications is that they have to be generated continuously if one
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it to successfully track the moving stimulus. To be sure, no one
experiences himself or herself as consciously willing the eyes to
move. Rather, what one experiences is the pre-specification and
sustainment of “track the stimulus.” How it is that one actually
accomplishes the tracking is simply outside of one’s conscious
awareness. This is interesting, for it implies that the anticipated
stimulus position (i.e., the specified distal effect) is not being gen-
erated consciously. This implies that while one is consciously pre-
specifying “track the stimulus” the anticipated stimulus positions
are being generated outside conscious awareness.
In order to better understand how it is one can learn to uncon-
sciously pre-specify distal effects, Jordan and Hunsinger (2008)
conducted an experiment in which one participant controlled
stimulus movements back and forth across a computer screen via
right and left button presses on a keyboard while another par-
ticipant, who could neither see nor hear the controller, observed
the movements of the stimulus on a separate monitor. At some
point during the trial the stimulus unexpectedly vanished and
the observer moved a crosshair to the location on the monitor
where she saw the dot vanish. After forty trials (i.e., Phase 1), the
two participants switched roles and the participant who previ-
ously controlled the stimulus now indicated perceived vanishing
points (i.e., Phase 2). Analysis revealed that participants with pre-
vious control experience produced significantly larger SD than
participants having no such experience.
In another experiment, Jordan and Hunsinger (2008) investi-
gated the aspects of Phase 1 control experience that led to later
changes in perception. Specifically, they replicated Experiment 1
except for the fact that during Phase 1, an observational learner
sat next to the controller. In Phase 2, the observational leaner
switched places with the Phase 1 naïve observer (i.e., the Phase 1
naïve observer controlled the stimulus while the Phase 1 obser-
vational learner observed stimulus movements and indicated
perceived vanishing points). In addition, during Phase 1, half of
the observational learners were allowed to see the movements of
the stimulus on the computer screen as well as hear and see the
button presses the controller made while controlling the stimu-
lus movements. In contrast to these “full access” participants, the
other half of the observational learners were denied access to the
actions of the controller (i.e., a board prevented them from seeing
the key presses while headphones prevented them from hearing
the key presses). Analyses revealed that the Phase 2 SD from the
“full access” observational learners was larger than that of the “no
action access” observational learners. In addition, the SD values of
the two groups basically replicated the SD pattern of Experiment
1, with “no action access” participants producing SD similar to
that of naïve observers, and “full access” participants producing
SD similar to that of observers having previous control experi-
ence. In short, observational learners who were given access to
the proximal and distal effects generated by the controller (i.e.,
key presses and stimulus movements, respectively) later perceived
the stimulus movements in the same way it was perceived by those
who had actually, previously controlled it.
Jordan and Hunsinger (2008) accounted for these finding by
asserting that during Phase 2 observation, the moving stimu-
lus activated the distal effect planning (i.e., planning of stimu-
lus movements) the participant had learned to generate while
controlling the stimulus during Phase 1. That is, having learned
to control the distal event in Phase 1 (i.e., the movements of the
stimulus), perception of the stimulus in Phase 2 activated Phase
1 control memories such that the participant experienced the
stimulus in terms of the control dynamics learned during Phase 1.
Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience shed light on how
“remembered control dynamics” can be activated during percep-
tion. First, areas of the cortex involved in planning distal events
(i.e., pre-motor cortex) are also involved in detecting distal events
(Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Hommel et al., 2001). This reveals that
we perceive distal events in terms of the plans we would gen-
erate to produce the distal event ourselves. Second, a finding
previously mentioned in the present paper, the vast majority
of the cortex shares recursive innervation with the cerebellum
(Miall, 2003; Koziol et al., 2011). Collectively, these finding indi-
cate that (1) seeing is planning, and (2) planning activated by
distal events is continuously, prospectively primed by recursive
cerebro-cerebellar memories. Thus, while participants controlled
the stimulus during Phase 1, patterns in the planning states
they generated for the stimulus (e.g., make it accelerate, make
it coast across the screen, make it decelerate, make it stop and
change direction) altered the cerebro-cerebellar dynamics gener-
ating these plans such that during later observation, the move-
ments of the stimulus gave rise to pre-motor planning dynamics
that were continuously, prospectively primed by remembered
planning patterns embedded in cerebro-cerebellar dynamics. To
be sure, during later observation participants did not have to
consciously generate anticipated stimulus locations. Rather, they
consciously activated “watch the stimulus,” and given that distal-
event detection (i.e., perception) and distal-event planning (i.e.,
distal effect planning) share neural overlap, they “perceived” the
stimulus movements in terms of distal-event plans that were con-
tinuously primed by cerebro-cerebellar memories. Thus, while
“watch the stimulus” was consciously pre-specified, conscious
anticipation of stimulus positions was unnecessary, for they were
provided by cerebro-cerebellar memories.
While the notions that (1) distal-event planning and detec-
tion share neural overlap, and (2) continuous priming of planning
via cerebro-cerebellar memories, collectively provide an account
of why observers with previous control experience give rise to
larger SD than naïve observers, they do not explain the differ-
ences in SD between the “full access” and “no action information”
observational learners. As an account, Jordan and Hunsinger
(2008) propose that full access observational learners developed
planning memories like those of controllers because while they
watched the controller control the stimulus during Phase 1, they
had continuous access to both the movements of the stimulus
(i.e., the distal effect) and the key presses the controller made
in order to control the movements (i.e., the proximal effect).
This assertion is supported by data indicating that in addition
to pre-motor cortical areas being involved in both planning and
detecting distal events (i.e., what is often referred to mirroring),
there are parietal cortical areas (i.e., PF) that are involved in
both the planning and detection of proximal events (i.e., body
movements). Iacoboni (2005) proposes that the pre-motor mir-
roring systems and the parietal mirroring systems, along with STS
located in the temporal lobe, collectively constitute a mirroring
www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 574 | 5
Jordan Wild Ways of Conscious Will
system that affords us the ability to imitate and understand the
actions of others. Iacoboni further proposes that while the plan-
ning which occurs in pre-motor cortex refers to distal events (e.g.,
grasp a raisin), the planning in parietal cortex has more to do with
proximal effects (i.e., the anticipated somatosensory feedback of
moving an effector). This assertion is based on findings that indi-
cate that as one simply observes meaningful and meaningless
actions, frontal mirroring activation is more prominent in the
former, while parietal activation is more prominent in the latter
(Grezes et al., 1999). This is because the parietal system is involved
in the analysis of body movement. This “frontal-parietal” division
of labor is further supported by the finding that that both systems
are active during the observation of meaningful and meaningless
actions if one has the goal of imitating the observed action.
Jordan and Hunsinger (2008) utilized Iacoboni’s frontal-
parietal-STS mirroring system theory of imitation as an account
of why observational learners with access to the actions later
produced large SD similar to that of those having previous con-
trol experience. Specifically, they assert that while observing the
controller control the movements of the stimulus via button
presses, the movements of the stimulus activated the frontal mir-
roring system (i.e., distal-effect system—Jordan, 2003) while the
sight and sound of the finger movements activated the pari-
etal mirroring system. These frontal-parietal activations would
have activated their associated cerebellar recursions. Given these
mirroring systems are involved in both pre-specification (i.e.,
planning) and detection (i.e., perception), their continuous acti-
vation via observation could have driven the observer through
the same planning states the controller was undergoing. It’s as if
the proximal-distal pattern generated by the controller hijacked
the multi-scale planning states of the observer and, in a sense,
drove the observer’s proximal-distal cerebro-cerebellar systems as
if the observer were generating the planning states endogenously.
It seems possible that the repeated, exogenous activation of these
systems led to changes in the observer’s cerebro-cerebellar sys-
tems such that during later observation, the movements of the
stimulus drove the observer’s planning states as if they had actu-
ally had previous control experience. Observational learners who
did not have access to the controller’s actions, would not have
been able to experience the proximal-distal patterns generated by
the controller (i.e., they only had access to the distal pattern—
the movements of the stimulus). Hence, they did not have the
opportunity to learn a proximal-distal model, and during later
observation, simply experienced the stimulus much like a naïve
observer.
Collectively, the work of Kerzel et al. (2001), Jordan et al.
(2002), and Jordan andHunsinger (2008) lead to two very impor-
tant implications regardingmulti-scale event control: (1) multiple
effects at different scales (i.e., proximal and distal) are pre-
specified continuously and simultaneously, (2) the pre-specified
effects are generated unconsciously via remembered “planning”
dynamics embodied in cerebro-cerebellar loops. In addition,
given that cortical areas involved in detecting events are also
involved in pre-specifying distal events, it seems difficult to sus-
tain the traditional practice of conceptualizing perception as an
attention attenuated input that is used to guide action. The find-
ing that mirroring systems are involved in both the detection and
pre-specification of distal effects indicates these systems simulta-
neously contain both the pre-specified distal effect (i.e., the goal)
and the current state of the distal event (i.e., feedback). Thus, it
seems evolution has left us with a rather elegant solution to con-
trolling distal effects. Instead of developing one system for doing
and another for seeing, as is assumed in traditional approaches
of psychological functionality, evolution has endowed us with a
host of systems that are able to pre-specify and detect distal events
simultaneously.
COGNITION AS MULTI-SCALE EVENT CONTROL
In addition to proximal and distal effects, however, participants in
the above-mentioned studies were simultaneously pre-specifying
and generating effects that could be labeled as cognitive. For
example, all of the participants were pre-specifying and sustaining
the abstract effect of complying with the experimenter’s instruc-
tions. This is an abstract effect, what James (1890) referred to
“very remote indeed” because it is a pre-specification of the how
the participant will configure herself in the current context.
There are infinite degrees of freedom in terms of the proximal-
distal pattern of effects one can pre-specify and sustain in a given
context. The participant could have hopped on one leg across the
room, or curled up into a corner and read a book. Both of these
proximal-distal configurations were afforded by the laboratory
context. Participants were able to inhibit all the other proximal-
distal options the context afforded and, instead, produce the
“make the stimulus move across the screen by pressing buttons”
option requested by the experimenter, because they were able
to pre-specify it (i.e., they constrained their proximal and distal
effect systems toward controlling the movements of the stimulus)
and sustain it (i.e., they prevented their proximal and distal effects
systems from producing a different configuration). As any care-
giver knows, getting a child to organize himself in a particular way
in a particular context (e.g., clean up his room) is very difficult.
Fair et al. (2007) report that the cinguloopercular system believed
to underlie set maintenance (i.e., the ability to focus on a specific
task—maintain a specific abstract effect—for an extended period
of time) segregates itself developmentally from the frontopari-
etal system believed to underlie adaptive online task control (i.e.,
proximal and distal effect control). Thus, by the time a college
student participates in an experiment, she has already developed
neural systems that afford abstract effect control.
To be sure, what a student is “doing” in an experiment is even
more abstract (i.e., remote) than complying with instructions.
For as students comply with instructions, they are actually doing
so in order to sustain an even more abstract (i.e., more remote)
effect; namely, receiving extra credit or monetary payment for
participating in an experiment. And what is more, they are pre-
specifying and sustaining the “extra credit” abstract effect in order
to work toward achieving the even more abstract effect (i.e., very
remote indeed) of receiving a particular grade in a course.
The point being made here is that when a person partici-
pates in an experiment, they are doing significantly more than
theories of action, perception, and/or cognition often give them
credit for doing. Specifically, while participants in the previously
mentioned studies were pre-specifying and producing the distal
effect regarding the distal stimulus (i.e., make the stimulus move
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back and forth across the screen), they were simultaneously pre-
specifying and generating multiple proximal effects (e.g., move
your eyes in a manner that allows you to track the stimulus,
and move your fingers in ways that result in the buttons being
pressed). To be sure, they were actually pre-specifying and gen-
erating many, many other proximal effects all at the same time,
such as hold the body in a particular position, keep the hand con-
figured in a way that affords fast button presses, and keep the head
positioned toward the computer monitor.
One could try to make the case participants were “perceiving,”
“acting,” and “thinking.” But in reality, as the above-stated exam-
ples indicate, they were doing so much more (i.e., pre-specifying
and sustaining a constellation of multi-scale effects), and they
were doing all of it at the same time.
HOWWE DO IT
Given that persons pre-specify and sustainmultiple effects atmul-
tiple time-scales simultaneously, it is not clear to what extent
the concepts “action,” “perception,” and “cognition” are terribly
useful in a scientific context. Traditional assumptions that frame
perception as input, action as output, and cognition as inter-
mediary processing, fail to acknowledge the cerebro-cerebellar
homology that underlies the various levels of effect control. This
leads them to overlook the fact that all levels of effect con-
trol entail pre-specification (i.e., planning) and detection (i.e.,
perception).
PLANNING AND CONTROL IN MSEC
To be sure, “planning” looks different in this framework in that it
(i.e., planning) takes place continuously at multiple levels of effect
control as the cerebellum prospectively and continuously primes
the cortex. “Control” also looks different within the framework of
MSEC because it (i.e., control) does not mean “cause” in the effi-
cient cause sense that one level of effect control (e.g., conscious
thought) “causes” changes in another (i.e., action) in the same
way one billiard ball “causes” another to move (Jordan and Ghin,
2007). Rather, within the framework of MSEC, different levels
of effect control constrain each other. That is, the more proxi-
mal scales of effect control (e.g., moving one’s hand a particular
way, or positioning one’s body in a particular configuration) find
themselves prospectively and continuously constrained toward the
generation of pre-specified distal effects (e.g., press the buttons or
sit in front of the computer, respectively). And these distal-effect
systems (Jordan, 2003; Clark, 2007) find themselves prospectively
and continuously constrained by more remote, abstract effect sys-
tems (e.g., comply with the experimenter’s instructions or obtain
extra credit points for a course) as well as proximal effect control
systems.
Constraint in this sense means that the cortical areas involved
in different levels of effect control influence each other continu-
ously via neural recursion. For example, Fair et al. (2007) report
that during the developmental segregation of the cinguloopercu-
lar system (i.e., the system believed to underlie set maintenance)
and the frontoparietal system (i.e., the system believed to under-
lie online task control), short-range neural connections between
closely adjacent brain regions within each system “grow down”
(i.e., decrease) with age, while long-range functional connections
between the systems “grow up” (i.e., increase). In addition, they
speculate,
These developmental dynamics may represent a learning mecha-
nism whereby precursors to adult task sets are originally derived
from more available signals generated by regions of the more
rapidly adaptive control network (i.e., frontoparietal). In this
sense, the performance of tasks with novel components would
rely more heavily on rapidly adaptive control generated by the
frontoparietal network. With greater age, and therefore greater
experience, stored task setsmay be retrieved and stablymaintained
throughout the task epoch by the cinguloopercular network. (p.
13511)
This developmental increase in long-range neural connectivity
allows different levels of effect control to constrain, not cause,
each other because at any given moment, the activity of a given
neural area is modulated continuously by both long-range and
short-range projections. Thus, the activity configuration in a
given cortical area at any given time constitutes an emergent,
dynamic compromise among all the forces impinging upon the
neurons that constitute that cortical area. In short, the extreme
level of recursion in brain organization makes if difficult, if not
impossible, to make coherent “efficient-cause” assertions regard-
ing brain dynamics in general, let alone the type of influence one
level of event control shares with another, specifically.
MSEC’s proposal to conceptualize brain dynamics in terms of
constraint as opposed to efficient cause is consistent with Rosen’s
(1991) assertion that the dynamics of biological systems in gen-
eral are simply closed to efficient cause. It is also consistent with
Van Orden and Holden (2002) assertion there does not exist a
causally isolated level of brain dynamics capable of mediating
efficient cause relationships between isolated content vehicles.
Rather, brain dynamics are inherently “interaction-dominant” in
that activity in all neurons, as well as neural areas, is continuously
modulated by the activity taking place in a plethora of other neu-
rons and neural populations. To continue the recursion, recursive
brain dynamics are continuously modulated by body and world
dynamics, just as body and world dynamics are continuously,
recursively, modulated by brain dynamics.
MULTI-SCALE RECURSION, ACTION CONTROL, AND CONSCIOUSNESS
In the midst of all this multi-scale recursion (i.e., constraint),
it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain “efficient cause”
approaches to “how we do it.” Neither psychological functions,
neural networks, nor neurons are causally isolated. As a result,
assertions regarding whether or not there exist efficient cause rela-
tionships between thought and action might simply be outdated.
And experiments that reveal persons to be capable of feeling as
though they caused events they did not, or as though they did not
cause events they actually did, might be misinterpreted.
Instead of such data revealing a delusion of control (Wegner,
2002), they might reveal intervals of uncertainty that emerge
spontaneously as one controls multiple effects simultaneously.
For example, Knöblich and Kircher (2004) asked participants to
control the trajectory of a dot presented on a computer moni-
tor. They did so by moving a stylus on a writing pad capable of
detecting and codifying stylus movements. Participants could not
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see their hand movements. The specific task was twofold: first,
they were to make the dot move in such a way that its movement
through the 12:00 position was synchronized with the presenta-
tion of a temporally predictable tone. Second, they were to lift the
stylus from the pad if, at any moment, they detected a difference
between stylus and dot movement.
To assess the participants’ sensitivity to perturbations of visuo-
motor coordinations, the experimenters manipulated the rela-
tionship between the movement dynamics recorded on the digital
pad and the visual effects displayed on the monitor such that
on the fourth cycle of a given trial, the velocity of the dot was
increased relative to the movements recorded on the pad. As a
result, in order to execute a visual circle, participants had to basi-
cally draw an ellipse. Results indicated that participants did not
become aware they were drawing ellipses versus circles until the
velocity of the stimulus was increased by 50% of its initial value.
From the traditional perspective, one might claim that during
the period in which participants were not aware of the discrep-
ancy between the ellipses they were generating with their hands
and the circles they were generating on the monitor, they were
suffering a delusion of control. That is, one might assert par-
ticipants were experiencing an illusion of conscious will because
they were intending to produced circles with their hands but were
actually producing ellipses. However, it might also be the case that
the participants’ proximal and distal control systems were func-
tioning properly (i.e., the proximal systems were controlling hand
movements—pre-specified and achieved kinesthetic feedback—
while the trajectory of the hand movements was continuously
constrained by distal effect systems). In this sense, one might pro-
pose that proximal and distal effect systems are coupled in such
a way that the function of the latter is not to “cause” the for-
mer, but rather, to “constrain” the former toward a specific distal
outcome—draw a circle.
Given that constraint takes time as the neurodynamics sup-
porting one level of event control influence the neurodynamics
of another, one should not be surprised to find temporal win-
dows (i.e., psychophysical intervals of uncertainty) during which
a distal-event system is “unaware” of the faster time-scale dynam-
ics of the proximal-event systems the former is constraining.
Dennett (1991) said much the same thing in his critique of Libet’s
(1985) paradigm. Specifically, he claimed that the temporal order,
or sequence, in which the nervous system distributes informa-
tion is not dictated by the order in which the information is
transduced by the sense organs. Rather, it is dictated by the tem-
poral constraints imposed by the on-going control of the body in
space-time. Dennett refers to these constraints as “temporal con-
trol windows” and contends that the nature of these windows is a
function of the relevant sensory-motor coordination.
When we are engaged in some act of manual dexterity, “finger-
tip time” should be the standard; when we are conducting an
orchestra, “ear time” might capture the registration. (p. 162)
According to MSEC, different event control systems will have
different “temporal control windows,” and results such as those
obtained by Knöblich and Kircher (2004) emerge out of the
multi-scale temporal control windows demanded by a certain
task.
This idea of yoked, yet distinct systems that function simulta-
neously and mutually constrain one another is part and parcel
to distinctions vision researchers frequently make when refer-
ring to Milner et al.’s (2006) vision for perception, versus vision
for action distinction. The major difference between MSEC and
Milner and Goodale’s model is that, in the latter, “vision for
action” and “vision for perception” basically reduce to “visual
input for moving” and “visual input for seeing,” respectively.
This notion that perception (i.e., seeing) constitutes input still
permeates both contemporary philosophical and psychologi-
cal discussions regarding the ventral-dorsal distinction (Clark,
2007; Milner et al., 2013). In MSEC, perception is not seeing;
it is not input. Rather, it is the pre-specification and detec-
tion of distal events. In short, it is distal-effect control. And
what is more, all levels of effect control entail pre-specification
(i.e., planning) and detection (i.e., perception). So to refer
to one brain area as a “doing” area and another as a “see-
ing” areas prevents one from recognizing that all such areas
are “doing” something (i.e., controlling effects) via the same
cerebro-cerebellar homology, just at different, yet yoked, time
scales.
WHY IT HAS MEANING
To be sure, conceptualizing “how we do it” in terms of multi-
scale systems sharing recursive interactions is not new. This
idea is espoused by many theorists in both the dynamical sys-
tems camp (Clark, 1997, 2000; van Gelder, 1998; Juarrero, 1999;
O’Regan and Nöe, 2001; Myin and O’Regan, 2002; Van Orden
andHolden, 2002) and the computationalist camp (Powers, 1973;
Kawato et al., 1987; Meyer and Kieras, 1997a,b). What distin-
guishes MSEC from these other approaches is the manner in
which it conceptualizes the nature of the multi-scale dynam-
ics. Specifically, MSEC is actually a sub-component of a larger
theoretical framework known as Wild Systems Theory (WST).
According to WST, living systems are comprised of multi-scale
systems of self-sustaining work. “Self-sustaining work,” in this
context refers to patterns of energy transformation that produce
products that feedback into and sustain the work that produced
the product in the first place. [For a thorough description of
WST and its take on self-sustaining work please see Jordan and
Ghin, 2006, 2007; Jordan, 2008; Jordan and Heidenreich, 2010;
Jordan and Vinson, 2012]. According to Jordan and Vinson
(2012):
At the chemical level, self-sustaining work has been referred to
as autocatalysis (Kauffman, 1995), the idea being that a self-
sustaining chemical system is one in which reactions produce
either their own catalysts or catalysts for some other reaction in
the system. At the biological level, self-sustaining work has been
referred to as autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980), again, the
idea being that a single cell constitutes a multi-scale system of
work in which lower-scale chemical processes give rise to the larger
biological whole of the cell which, in turn, provides a context in
which the lower-scale work sustains itself and the whole it gives
rise to (Jordan and Ghin, 2006). Hebb (1949) referred to the self-
sustaining nature of neural networks as the “cell assembly,” the
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idea being that neurons that fire together wire together. Jordan
and Heidenreich (2010) recently cast this idea in terms of self-
sustaining work by examining data that indicate the generation of
action potentials increases nuclear transcription processes in neu-
rons which, in turn, fosters synapse formation. At the behavioural
level, Skinner (1976) referred to the self-sustaining nature of
behaviour as operant conditioning, the idea being that behaviours
sustain themselves in one’s behavioural repertoire as a function
of the consequences they generate. Streeck and Jordan (2009)
recently described communication as a dynamical self-sustaining
system in which multi-scale events such as postural alignment,
gesture, gaze, and speech produce outcomes that sustain an ongo-
ing interaction. And finally, Odum (1988) and Vandervert (1995)
used the notion of self-sustaining work to refer to ecologies in
general. (p. 235)
WSTs assertion that organisms are constituted of multi-scale
self-sustaining work reveals the dynamic homologies that tran-
scend both the phyla and the nesting of multi-scale energy-
transformation systems that constitute a single organism. From
plants, to neurons, to behavior, to persons, to human societies,
increasingly complex systems of work (i.e., energy transforma-
tion) have evolved precisely because the very work of which they
are constituted, is self-sustaining. That is, the work produces cat-
alysts for either the work itself, or some other level of work in the
multi-scale system.
In addition to revealing the multi-scale homologies that con-
stitute an organism, WST’s notion of multi-scale self-sustaining
work affords a conceptual reframe of the context in which
organisms sustain themselves. In traditional accounts, nature
is conceptualized as being physical, and phenomenal prop-
erties such as meaning, value, and consciousness are con-
ceptualized as either identical with the physical (i.e., iden-
tity theory), emergent from the physical (i.e., emergentism),
as an informational property of causal relations (i.e., func-
tionalism), or as an aspect of reality other than the physical
(i.e., double-aspect theory and property dualism). Again, as
was stated at the outset of the present paper, in all of these
positions, phenomenal properties do not constitute a logically
necessary aspect of the causal story. As a result, phenomenal
properties do not enter into a scientific, causal description of
what we do and how we do it. In short, consciousness is an
epiphenomenon.
Within WST however, “nature” is conceptualized as a
self-organizing energy-transformation hierarchy (Odum, 1988;
Vandervert, 1995) within which “the fuel source dictates the
consumer” (Jordan and Ghin, 2006). What this means is that
any system that sustains itself on a given fuel source (e.g.,
plants on sunlight, herbivores on plants, or carnivores on her-
bivores) must be constituted in such a way that it is capa-
ble of addressing all the constraints involved in capturing that
fuel source. Given this necessary connection between a con-
sumer, its fuel source, and the context in which the two exist, it
seems appropriate to claim that an organism constitutes a multi-
scale, self-sustaining embodiment of the constraints entailed in
taking in, transforming, and dissipating its fuel source. Said
another way, organisms are self-sustaining embodiments of the
contexts in which they phylogenetically and ontogenetically
emerged.
Conceptualizing organisms as embodiments of context is
an important move for WST because it provides a means of
conceptualizing organisms as inherently meaningful. Specifically,
if an organism constitutes an embodiment of context, then it is
naturally and necessarily “about” that context. That is, its internal
dynamics are phylogenetically and ontogenetically emergent from
the energy-transformation hierarchy in which it has sustained
itself. As a result,
. . . there is no epistemic gap between an organism and its environ-
ment. Organisms do not need to be “informed” by environments
in order to be about environments because they are necessarily
“about” the contexts they embody. Rather, what self-sustaining
systems need do is sustain relationships with the contexts in
which they are embedded in ways that lead them to sustainment.
According to WST, meaning is constitutive of embodied context
(i.e., bodies). As a result, living systems are necessarily meaningful
(Jordan, 2000a), not because a body is alive or dead, because it is
physical, or because it is biological. Living is meaning because it is
sustained, embodied context. (Jordan and Vinson, 2012, p. 9)
EMBODIED CONTEXT, ACTION-CONTROL, AND CONSCIOUSNESS
Given the notion of “embodied context,” WST asserts that the
phenomenon we refer to as consciousness is actually a phyloge-
netically scaled-up recursion on the embodied aboutness inherent
in all organisms. What determines the distality of the aboutness
(i.e., the level of conscious awareness) an organism entails varies
with the distality of the contexts in which the organism can pre-
specify outcomes and work to sustain those outcomes: resident,
remote, and sometimes very remote indeed. As an example of
species differences in the scale of event control, while my dog
and I can jointly sustain the outcome of playing tug-of-war in
the hear-and-now, my dog is not able to organize himself in the
hear-and-now in order to play tug-of-war again at the same time
tomorrow. Dogs are not able to pre-specify the very remote effect,
“tomorrow,” and therefore, cannot sustain a relationship with it.
From this perspective, I am able to pre-specify and sustain rela-
tionships with contexts that are vastly more “remote” than those
of my dog.
On the one hand, it may seem that the obvious account of
why different species sustain effects at different time-scales is a
neural one; organisms capable of sustaining increasingly abstract
effects (e.g., “tomorrow,” “next June,” or “forever”) can do so
because they have more sophisticated brains. On the other hand,
WST proposes it is more than just brains. Rather, consistent with
Oyama (2000), Jordan (2008) asserts that the sustainment of
abstract contexts necessitates the emergence and sustainment of
external contexts such as language and technology specifically,
and culture, in general (what Oyama refers to as developmental
contexts). It is within this entire multi-scale, contextually emer-
gent, self-sustaining system of work that nested sub-systems (i.e.,
individual humans) are able to generate and sustain abstract
contexts. Again, consistent with Oyama, from this perspective,
infants inherit much more than genes. In short, they inherit a
culture.
Within such a multi-scale, self-sustaining transformation hier-
archy, the issue of action-control and consciousness is about
so much more than the issue of whether or not conscious
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thoughts cause actions. To be sure, consciousness (i.e., embod-
ied aboutness, or embodied context) does exist, but not in
the way it is thought to exist within traditional frameworks
that conceptualize consciousness as being opposed to uncon-
sciousness. Again, within WST, “aboutness” is a constituent
property of all self-sustaining embodiments of context. All self-
sustaining systems are abountess (Jordan, 2000a). (See Jordan
and Vinson, 2012, for a thorough analysis of how these ideas
are related to the non-living systems). Thus, according to WST,
the issue of consciousness and action control as it is tradi-
tionally framed, is framed in WST in terms of the effects
that are most prescient during any given movement of multi-
scale effect control. For example, while conversing with a
friend and walking down a flight of stairs, sensed foot pres-
sure is not prescient (i.e., it is not within one’s currently
reportable conscious states) until there is an error (i.e., pre-
specified and attained foot pressure do not match). As one
starts to fall because the predicted floor is not there, sensed foot
pressure becomes prescient; it comes to dominate immediate,
reportable consciousness as one struggles to avoid falling down
the stairs.
From this perspective, consciousness does not reside at a par-
ticular level of event control. Instead, it is fluid and makes its way
transiently to different levels of effect control as different effects
become contextually prescient (Jordan, 2003). This implies that
consciousness has more to do with managing relationships across
different levels of effect control. In a test of this idea, Kumar and
Srinivasan (2013) asked participants to use a joystick to aim at tar-
gets on a computer screen. Target trajectory entailed one of three
levels of random perturbation. After the participant pulled the
trigger on the joystick, a stimulus appeared at the targeted loca-
tion, and the participants indicated (1) how much time passed
between the trigger pull and the appearance of the stimulus, and
(2) how confident they were that they themselves were the author
of the action. Results revealed that if participants missed the tar-
get (i.e., the more distal effect was not achieved), estimates of
the action-stimulus interval were significantly correlated with the
actual action-stimulus interval as well as the degree of noise in
the target movements. Specifically, as the amount of noise in the
target movements decreased, time estimates also decreased. This
temporal attraction of the timing of a post-action stimulus toward
the moment of the action is referred to as intentional binding
(Jordan, 2000b; Haggard et al., 2002), and it is assumed to con-
stitute an implicit measure of one’s sense of agency. If, however,
the participant hit the target, the pattern changed. Specifically,
estimates of the action-stimulus interval were significantly cor-
related with the action-stimulus interval (i.e., intentional bind-
ing occurred), but they were not correlated with the degree of
noise in the stimulus. This indicates that once the distal effect
is achieved, one’s consciousness is more about the achieved dis-
tal effect than the constraints that had to be addressed by the
proximal control systems as they worked to achieve the distal
effect.
The idea that consciousness ebbs and flows across different
levels of effect control has much in common with Vallacher
et al.’s (1989) action-identity theory, which assumes that there are
many different ways to cognitively identify (i.e., represent) a given
action, but only one identification tends to be prepotent for the
actor at any given moment:
. . . although talking, for example, could be identified as sharing
information, expressing an opinion, influencing someone, passing
time, or choosing words, the actor is likely to have in mind only
one of these identifications. (p. 199)
The notion of consciousness working as a manager across levels
of effect control is also consistent with Baars’ global workspace
hypothesis (1988), which asserts that the purpose of conscious-
ness is to make the contents regarding a specific conscious experi-
ence massively available to a host of unconscious brain processes
so that these latter brain processes can be brought to bear on the
immediate situation. From this perspective, consciousness ebbs
and flows across different contents as different problems emerge
for the system in real time. Morsella (2005) proposes a similar
view in which the purpose of phenomenal (i.e., conscious) states
is the resolution of conflicts between action plans as different
action systems compete for expression through the skeletal mus-
cular system, what he refers to as PRISM (i.e., parallel responses
into skeletal muscle).
Common to PRISM, Global Workspace Theory, and WST is
the idea that potential conflicts among competing actions (i.e.,
effect control systems) need to be sorted out by the system.
From the traditional perspective, this might be taken to mean
that a certain conscious state intervenes and causes a particular
action to be expressed. From the perspective of WST, it means
that at any given moment, the pattern of multi-scale effects one
works to control emerges spontaneously and continuously out
of both exogenous influences that activate pre-specifications of
past effect-control episodes via cerebro-cerebellar systems, and
the endogenous constellation of constraint that builds up over
the life course across different levels of effect control. Imamizu
and Kawato (2009) review a host of empirical findings that are
consistent with the idea that moment-to-moment changes in
effect-control dynamics, what they refer to as the switching of
internal models, is brought about my the continuous, exogenous
and endogenous modulation of internal models (i.e., cerebellar
control models).
On the one hand, GWT and PRISM seem to have the advan-
tage of Occam’s razor. They provide a clear, causal story of how
changes in a physical system like the brain are associated with
conscious states. On the other, WST overcomes the potential
epiphenomenalism inherent in the physicalism of both GWT and
PRISM, because WST provides an account of what consciousness
is and why it is necessary. However, according to WST, con-
sciousness is not necessary because it helps physical brains sort
out potential actions. Rather, it is necessary because it is what
organisms are.
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of the present paper was to present an approach
to the issue of consciousness and action control that, in the end,
challenges the utility of concepts such as consciousness and action
control in a science of what we do and how we do it. Traditional
models assert we do things such as act, perceive, think, attend,
and remember. While these concepts have great utility in daily
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life, from which they emerged, it is my contention they are not
complex enough to address the host of hypercomplex regulari-
ties cognitive science has discovered over the past 30 years. Brains
specifically, and living systems in general, have turned out to be
closed to efficient cause (Rosen, 1991) and interaction-dominant
(Van Orden andHolden, 2002). Action oriented areas of the brain
have turned out to be simultaneously perceptual (Miall, 2003),
andmoment-to-moment experience finds itself having a prospec-
tive, anticipatory edge as memories of the past continuously
prime those areas of the cortex we once thought served the
purpose of informing us about the present. What we do and how
we do it turns out to be continuous, multi-scale, and wild. By wild
I do not mean out of control. To the contrary, I mean massively
in control. Not like a closed system such as a robotic arm plac-
ing hyper accurate welds on an assembly line, or a computer code
parsing chunks into appropriate sectors. Rather, like an open sys-
tem such as a bird in flight, whose wing dynamics absorb and
resist the multi-scale wind patterns it encounters in real time, not
because it has to control its flight, but because controlling flight is
what it is.
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